Masked-man fallacy
In philosophical logic, the masked-man fallacy (also known as the intensional fallacy or epistemic fallacy) is the false assumption that knowledge or a belief about an object (an intension) can be used to correctly tell it apart from another object (as opposed to facts, that can be used to correctly tell two objects apart). It is committed when one makes an illicit use of Leibniz's law in an argument.
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Masked-man fallacy
In philosophical logic, the masked-man fallacy (also known as the intensional fallacy or epistemic fallacy) is the false assumption that knowledge or a belief about an object (an intension) can be used to correctly tell it apart from another object (as opposed to facts, that can be used to correctly tell two objects apart). It is committed when one makes an illicit use of Leibniz's law in an argument.
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